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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Kevin Donald Cheatham appeals from the district court's order denying 
his motion to modify the term of his probation that prohibits him from possessing 
a firearm or residing in a home where firearms are present. 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of Proceedings 
The state charged Cheatham with grand theft by possession of stolen 
property. (R., pp.23-24, 42-43.) Cheatham pied guilty to the charged offense 
and the court imposed a unified five-year sentence with three years fixed, but 
suspended the sentence and placed Cheatham on supervised probation for two 
years. (R., pp.44, 50-53.) More than six months later, Cheatham filed a "Motion 
to Amend Judgment" in which he asked the court to eliminate the condition, 
imposed by his probation officer, that he not possess firearms or reside in a 
home where firearms are present. (R., pp.61-62.) The court denied the motion 
and Cheatham filed a timely notice of appeal. (R., pp.92-100.) 
1 
ISSUES 
Cheatham states the issues on appeal as: 
I. Whether the District Court had jurisdiction to amend the 
probation condition contained in the judgment. 
II. Whether the District Court properly reviewed the rule 
imposed by Probation and Parole as an agency action. 
111. Whether a person convicted of Grand Theft may as a 
condition of probation be prohibited from possessing a 
firearm. 
IV. Whether the defendant may be prohibited from living in a 
dwelling with his family where a firearm is kept. 
V. Whether the Idaho Department of Corrections may prohibit 
the defendant from living in a residence where a firearm is 
kept by another person in a secured location the probationer 
has no access to because the owner of the firearm is not a 
member of law enforcement. 
(Appellant's Brief, p.3.) 
The state wishes to rephrase the issue on appeal as follows: 
Has Cheatham failed to establish reversible error in the district court's 
denial of his motion to amend the terms of Cheatham's probation? 
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ARGUMENT 
Cheatham Has Failed To Establish The District Court Committed Reversible 
Error In Denying Cheatham's Motion To Modify The Firearm Condition Of His 
Probation 
A. Introduction 
The district court denied Cheatham's request to modify the term of 
probation that prohibits Cheatham from possessing a firearm or residing in a 
home where firearms are present. (R., pp.92-97.) Cheatham argues that the 
district court erred because, he asserts: (1) the court applied an incorrect legal 
standard, and (2) the firearm condition of his probation is unconstitutional. 
(Appellant's Brief, pp.5-15.) Cheatham claims the condition is unconstitutional 
because, he argues, it violates his "right to bear arms, that banished him from his 
family's home, and that was patently in violation of the Equal Protection Clause." 
(Appellant's Brief, p.7.) Application of the correct legal standards to the facts 
shows Cheatham's constitutional arguments are meritless. Cheatham has, 
therefore, failed to establish reversible error in the district court's order denying 
Cheatham's request to modify the firearm condition of his probation. 
B. Standard of Review 
The trial court has broad discretion in deciding upon the terms of 
probation. State v. Mummert, 98 Idaho 452,454,566 P.2d 1110, 1112 (1977). 
However, 
[t]he court's discretion to impose a term or condition is bounded by 
whether the term or condition of probation is reasonably related to 
the purpose of probation, namely rehabilitation. State v. Mummert, 
98 Idaho 452, 454, 566 P.2d 1110, 1112 (1997). The "reasonable 
relationship" is the legal standard by which the validity of a term or 
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condition must be judged. . . . Whether the terms or conditions 
meet the legal standard is a question of law, see Mummert, 98 
Idaho at 454, 566 P.2d at 1112, over which [the appellate courts] 
exercise free review. See, e.g., State v. Joyner, 121 Idaho 376, 
378, 825 P.2d 99, 101 (Ct. App. 1992); State v. Ramirez, 121 Idaho 
319,321,824 P.2d 894,896 (Ct. App. 1991). 
State v. Jones, 123 Idaho 315,318,847 P.2d 1176, 1179 (Ct. App. 1993). 
C. The Firearm Condition Of Cheatham's Probation Does Not Violate Any Of 
Cheatham's Constitutional Rights 
Idaho law authorizes a sentencing court to place a defendant convicted of 
a crime on probation subject to "such terms and conditions as it deems 
necessary and appropriate," I.C. § 19-2601 (2), and the court may "modify any 
conditions of probation" at any time, I.C. § 20-221 (1 ). The board of correction is 
responsible for supervising probationers. I.C. § 20-219(1 )(a). Included among 
the terms of probation in Cheatham's case is that he "be placed on a level of 
supervision to be deemed appropriate by the Department of Corrections," that he 
"follow all rules and regulations as directed by [his] probation officer," and that he 
"sign a Probation Agreement." (R., p.51.) In accordance with this term, 
Cheatham signed a probation agreement in which he agreed to the following 
condition: 
Firearms or Weapons: The defendant shall not purchase, carry, 
possess or have control of any firearms, chemical weapons, 
electronic weapons, explosives or other dangerous weapons. 
Other dangerous weapons may include, but are not limited to, 
knives with blades over two and one half inches (2 W') in length; 
switch-blades; knives; brass knuckles; swords; throwing stars; and 
other martial arts weapons. Any weapons or firearms seized will be 
forfeited to IDOC for disposal. The defendant shall not reside in 
any location that contains firearms unless the firearms are secured 
and this portion of the rule is exempted in writing by the district 
manager. 
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(Exhibit A (Idaho Department of Correction Standard Agreement of Supervision); 
see Tr., p.21, Ls.12-25 (testimony that Cheatham signed such an agreement).) 
Because of the foregoing condition, and because Cheatham lived with his 
parents, Cheatham's father moved his eleven guns to a friend's house. (Tr., p.6, 
L.20 - p.7, L.4.) Cheatham, however, asked the court to amend the condition, 
contending (1) the crime he pied guilty to is "not a violent crime and does not ban 
him from owning firearms after probation is over"; (2) the requirement is "patently 
overbroad"; and (3) the condition violates his constitutional rights. (R., pp.61-76.) 
The district court denied Cheatham's motion. (R., pp.92-97.) 
On appeal, Cheatham first contends that the district court "correctly 
understood that it had jurisdiction over the terms of [his] probation," but 
incorrectly "reviewed the condition imposed by probation as an agency action 
under I.C. § 67-5279." (Appellant's Brief, pp.4-5.) Cheatham then asks this 
Court to "reverse the decision of the District Court with instructions to consider 
the legality of the condition imposed by probation." (Appellant's Brief, p.6.) This 
Court should decline to do so because the district court did "consider the legality 
of the condition" and, regardless of the standard applied by the district court, 
whether a term or condition of probation is legal is a question of law over which 
this Court exercises free review. Jones, 123 Idaho at 318, 847 P.2d at 1179. 
In considering Cheatham's request to amend, the district court correctly 
recited the following relevant legal standards: 
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Under Idaho Code Section 19-2601 a trial court has broad 
discretion when imposing terms of probation that restrict a 
defendant's liberty. I.C. § 19-2601; State v. Davis, 107 Idaho 215, 
217, 687 P2d 998, 1000 (Ct. App. 1984). The statute's language is 
meant to give the court maximum flexibility to fashion probation that 
is most appropriate for the individual defendant. State v. Gonzales, 
144 Idaho 775, 780, 171 P.3d 266, 271 (Ct. App. 2007)[,] citing 
State v. McCool, 139 Idaho 804, 807, 87 P.3d 291, 294 (2004). As 
part of probation, the court may restrict a defendant's "right to 
travel, to change jobs or residences, or even to marry." Davis, 107 
Idaho at 217, 687 P.2d at 998. Likewise, it is also well recognized 
that a felon's right to bear arms may be restricted as part of 
probation. D.C. v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626-27, 128 S.Ct. 2783, 
2817, 171 L.Ed.2d 637 (2008). The purpose of these restrictions 
and probation is to rehabilitate the defendant under proper control 
and supeNision. Davis, 107 Idaho at 217,687 P.2d at 998. 
"However, the terms of probation must be reasonably related 
to the purpose of rehabilitation." Davis, 107 Idaho at 217, 687 P.2d 
at 998[,] citing State v. Mummert, 98 Idaho 452, 566 P.2d 1110 
(1977). 
(R., pp.94-95.) 
After reciting the foregoing standards, the court continued: 
In this case the Court placed the restriction at issue on 
Defendant because it's a standard part of the probation agreement, 
which is overseen by Probation and Parole, a division of the Idaho 
Department of Corrections. Idaho Admin. [R]. 11.11.04. The 
Department of Corrections is an administrative agency, and, thus, 
the Court affords its actions a strong presumption of validity. Id.; 
Duncan v. State Bd. of Accountancy, 149 Idaho 1, 3, 232 P.3d 322, 
324 (2010). As such, the Court will only reverse the agency's 
action if that action is found to be "(a) in violation of constitution or 
statutory provisions; (b) in excess of the statutory authority of the 
agency; (c) made upon unlawful procedure; or (d) arbitrary, 
capricious, or an abuse of discretion." I.C. § 67-5279. 
Here the standard probation agreement does not fit into any 
of the above categories. If it were to fit into any of them, it would 
be the last one. "An action is capricious if it was done without a 
rational basis. It is arbitrary if it was done in disregard of the facts 
and circumstances presented or without adequate determining 
principles." Am. Lung Ass'n of Idaho/Nevada v. State, Dep't of 
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Agric., 142 Idaho 544, 547, 130 P.3d 1082, 1085 (2006) (citations 
omitted). 
(R., p.95.) 
The district court then "look[ed] at the facts at hand," and found "the 
condition that [Cheatham] live in a residence without firearms" was not "arbitrary 
and capricious" because Cheatham had "control of the residence for long 
uninterrupted periods." (R., p.95.) "As a result," the district court found the 
restriction as "rational" and "related to the specific facts and circumstances of 
this case." (R., p.95.) 
The state agrees that the "arbitrary and capricious" standard the district 
court applied was incorrect because the district court has ultimate authority over 
the terms and conditions of probation, I.C. § 19-2601 (2), and the Department of 
Correction's standard terms of supervision does not constitute agency action 
subject to judicial review. See Gibson v. Ada County Sheriff's Dept., 139 Idaho 
5, 7, 72 P.3d 845, 847 (2003) (noting "IAPA and its judicial review standards 
apply to agency actions" but, under I.C. § 67-5201(2), "the state board of 
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correction" is not included in the definition of "agency"). 1 It is unclear from the 
record, however, whether the district court, in considering factors relevant to 
review of agency action, disregarded the applicable standard despite its 
discussion of that standard, and concluded that the firearm restriction was not 
reasonably related to the purpose of probation but decided it could not modify 
the condition absent a finding that it was arbitrary and capricious. Nevertheless, 
this Court need not parse through the language of the district court's decision 
and divine what the court meant because, ultimately, whether the condition is 
1 It appears the district court may have engaged in this line of analysis because 
Cheatham questioned the district manager at the hearing on his motion about 
whether the Department's standard agreement was a "rule that was promulgated 
through IDAPA" (Tr., p.23, Ls.1-6), and, in his post-hearing brief, asserted: 
Thus, this Court comes to the actual implementation of the 
"rule" contained in the probation agreement to this matter. First, it 
must be said that no such "rule" has ever been promulgated 
according to IDAPA, nor does it even appear in the various policies 
available on the Department's website. However, while the rule 
clearly impinges on the defendant's constitutional rights, it does so 
under the authority of this Court, and thus likely does not need to 
pass any administrative hurdles. Rather, it must simply comply 
with the limits of this Court's power. 
(R., p.74). 
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unconstitutional, as Cheatham contends, is a question of law reviewed de novo.2 
Jones, 123 Idaho at 318,847 P.2d at 1179; see also State v. Brauch, 133 Idaho 
215, 218, 984 P.2d 703, 706 (1999) (citations and quotations omitted) ("this 
Court exercises free review over questions of law, including whether 
"constitutional requirements have been satisfied in light of facts found"). 
Remand is therefore unnecessary. 
Cheatham raises three constitutional challenges to the firearm condition 
of his probation; all three challenges are without merit. First, Cheatham argues 
that the firearm condition violates his right to possess a firearm under the Idaho 
Constitution and the Second Amendment to the United States Constitution, and 
violates his right to self-defense. (Appellant's Brief, pp.9-11.) This claim is 
specious. The United States Supreme Court has expressly recognized that 
"longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons" does not 
violate the Constitution, District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626 (2008), 
and Cheatham cites no authority for the proposition that Idaho's state 
constitutional right to possess a firearm cannot be limited by similar prohibitions 
(see generally Appellant's Brief, p.8-11). In fact, the state constitutional 
2 Although Cheatham notes the requirement that a "condition of probation must 
be reasonably related to the purpose of probation" (Appellant's Brief, p.8), he 
does not claim that the firearm condition he sought to have modified does not 
satisfy this standard (see generally Appellant's Brief, pp.7-15). Instead, 
Cheatham argues the condition is unconstitutional. (Appellant's Brief, pp.7-15.) 
Thus, although the state submits the condition satisfied the "reasonably related" 
standard, this Court need not address that issue because Cheatham has not 
claimed otherwise. See Murray v. State, 156 Idaho 159, 168, 321 P.3d 709, 718 
(2014) (quoting State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 263, 923 P.3d 966, 970 (1996) 
(noting an issue will not be considered if "either authority or argument is 
lacking"). 
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provisions Cheatham does cite expressly provide that the right to "keep and bear 
arms" "shall not prevent the passage of laws" that govern, among other things, 
"penalties for the possession of firearms by a convicted felon." (Appellant's 
Brief, p.10 (quoting Idaho Const., art. I,§ 11).) Because Cheatham currently has 
no right to possess a firearm, the firearm condition of his probation is not 
unconstitutional. (Appellant's Brief, p.11.) 
Cheatham's second constitutional claim is that, even "assuming" he "can 
be barred from possessing firearms, the next question presented in this matter is 
whether he can be forced from his home because another person he lives with 
possesses a firearm." (Appellant's Brief, p.11.) According to Cheatham, this is 
"banishment" that "treads upon constitutional guarantees." (Appellant's Brief, 
pp.11-12.) This claim fails factually and legally. As a matter of fact, Cheatham 
has not been "banished" from anywhere. Cheatham accepted, as a condition of 
probation, that he not "reside in any location that contains firearms." (See Exhibit 
A) In accordance with that term, and to facilitate Cheatham's ability to live with 
him, Cheatham's father removed his firearms from his house. (Tr., p.7, Ls.2-4 
"Right now [the guns] are at our friend's home just to comply with terms of 
probation.").) Any implication that Cheatham has been "banished" from "his" 
home is belied by the record. 
As a matter of law, the Supreme Court's decision in Moore v. City of East 
Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1932), the case upon which Cheatham relies, does not 
support Cheatham's "banishment" argument. (Appellant's Brief, pp.12-13.) In 
Moore, the Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality of an ordinance that 
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"limit[ed] occupancy of a dwelling unit to members of a single family" and 
"contain[ed] an unusual and complicated definitional section that recognize[d] as 
a 'family' only a few categories of related individuals." 431 U.S. at 495-496. The 
Court found the ordinance unconstitutional, concluding the Constitution does not 
allow the government to "standardiz[e] its children and its adults by forcing all to 
live in certain narrowly defined family patterns." kl at 506. Nowhere in Moore 
did the Supreme Court hold that a court could not restrict where a probationer 
lives and it is well-established in this state that such restrictions are permissible. 
State v. Davis, 107 Idaho 215, 217, 687 P.2d 998, 1000 (Ct. App. 1984) (citation 
omitted) ("As a condition of granting freedom to a probationer, society has the 
right to impose stringent limitations on behavior. This may include restrictions on 
important liberties, such as the right to travel, to change jobs or residences, or 
even to marry."). The Supreme Court's reference to "family values" as a basis 
for invalidating an ordinance that had nothing to do with probation falls far short 
of establishing that a condition of probation that prevents a defendant from living 
in a home where firearms are present is unconstitutional. 
Cheatham's third and final constitutional challenge is based on the Equal 
Protection Clause. (Appellant's Brief, pp.13-15.) This argument is premised 
upon the portion of the firearm condition, as set forth in the Standard Agreement 
of Supervision, that allows the district manager to make an exception to the 
condition. (Exhibit A.) At the hearing on Cheatham's motion, Donald Kiehl, a 
district manager for the Idaho Department of Correction, testified that "there are 
some exceptions that are made, primarily with a household that has a current 
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law enforcement officer ... living in the home." (Tr., p.16, L.23- p.17, L.12.) 
From this, Cheatham constructs an equal protection argument in which he 
asserts: "This Court may not hold that a police officer's need to have a firearm in 
the residence somehow outweighs a citizen's right to a firearm." (Appellant's 
Brief, p.14.) Phrased differently, Cheatham contends "the only question is: why 
is everyone safer if [Cheatham's father,] Steven Cheatham is a police officer, as 
opposed to a cement worker?"3 (Appellant's Brief, p.14.) Although Cheatham 
acknowledges he cannot "stand on his father's rights," he contends he "can claim 
that his right to live with his parents and take care of his mother is being violated 
because the Department's rule unconstitutionally discriminates between himself 
and other similarly situated probationers." (Appellant's Brief, p.15.) However 
Cheatham wishes to frame his equal protection argument, it fails. 
"'The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment commands 
that no State shall 'deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection 
of the laws,' which is essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated 
should be treated alike."' State v. Hamlin, 156 Idaho 307, 316, 324 P.3d 1006, 
1015 (Ct. App. 2014) (quoting City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 
U.S. 432, 439 (1985)). '"Equal protection issues focus on classifications within 
statutory schemes that allocate benefits or burdens differently among the 
categories of persons affected."' Hamlin, 156 Idaho at 316, 324 P.3 at 1015 
(quoting In re Bermudes, 141 Idaho 157, 160, 106 P.3d 1123, 1126 (2005)). 
3 Steven Cheatham testified that he works at Interstate Concrete & Asphalt. (Tr., 
p.9, Ls.8-9.) 
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When evaluating a claim under the Equal Protection Clause, this Court engages 
in a three-step analysis: first, the Court must "identify the classification that is 
being challenged;" second, the Court "determine[s] the standard under which the 
classification will be judicially reviewed;" and third, the Court must "decide 
whether the appropriate standard has been satisfied." kl "Therefore, in order 
for [Cheatham] to prevail [on his Equal Protection claim,] he would be required to 
show that he, by virtue of some classification, is being treated differently than a 
person who does not share that classification." Hamlin, 150 Idaho at 316, 324 
P.3d at 1015. 
The Department's standard supervision agreement that allows for an 
exception to the firearm condition is not a statutory scheme based on any 
classification. Nor is Cheatham's argument actually based on "similarly situated 
probationers," as he claims. (Appellant's Brief, p.15.) A "similarly situated 
probationer" to Cheatham would be a probationer that does not live with 
someone in law enforcement, not a probationer that lives with a member of law 
enforcement. Even then, there is no blanket exception for law enforcement in 
either the standard agreement or as a matter of policy. While Mr. Kiehl testified 
that he has not denied the exception where the probationer lives with a member 
of law enforcement in the "couple dozen" times he has been asked to make the 
exception in his "seven or eight years" as a district manager (Tr., p.23, L.13 -
p.24, L.5), he did not testify that the exception would always be granted under 
those circumstances. To the contrary, Mr. Kiehl testified that the probationer's 
crime of conviction is also taken into consideration. (Tr., p.17, Ls.8-16.) 
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Even if the factual underpinnings of Cheatham's equal protection 
argument warranted consideration under an equal protection analysis, Cheatham 
has made no effort to establish a violation under the applicable framework 
because he has not identified what standard he thinks would apply to the alleged 
suspect classification nor explained why a distinction based on living with a law 
enforcement officer would not pass constitutional muster. (Appellant's Brief, 
pp.14-15.) Ultimately, Cheatham's only argument is that he believes he has a 
constitutional right to live with his parents and take care of his mother. No such 
right exists and no viable equal protection argument has been identified. 
Cheatham has failed to establish any constitutional defect in the firearm 
condition of his probation or any other basis for remanding this case. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's 
decision denying Cheatham's motion to amend his conditions of probation. 
DATED this 2nd day of December, 2015. 
eputy Attorney General 
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